Relational governance works well in relatively small communities, which may be too small to allow perfect competition. This paper explores this idea using two models. In a spatial model with monopolistic competition, relational governance constrains the size of firms and can lead to inefficiently excessive entry. In a model where high quality is self-enforcing because its providers get a sufficiently large flow of rents, profitable entry at a scale that credibly signals high quality may be infeasible, and incumbents may be able to deter entry while getting supernormal profits.
Introduction
Research in many disciplines over the last two decades has done much to clarify the role of relation-based governance to support economic transactions when the state's rule-based legal system is faulty. Historical and game-theoretic work of Greif collected in his book (2006) , anthropological studies of Ensminger (1992) , sociological ethnographic work of Gambetta (1993) , legal analyses of Bernstein (1992 Bernstein ( , 2001 ), Libecap (1989) and Ellickson (1991) , and economic modeling of Kranton (1996) , Li (2003) and Dixit (2004, Chapter 3) , are just a few among the many writings that show how bottom-up self-enforcing institutions of property right protection and contract enforcement can arise and sustain themselves in communities of transactors. These institutions function through a set of norms and sanctions. Members are expected to adhere to the stipulated norms of good or honest conduct in their business transactions; those failing to do so are subject to the stated sanctions. The sanctions can involve not only exclusion from future trading opportunities, but also cutting off access to other group benefits such as business and social contacts. Sometimes members other than the victim of the original norm violation must incur a private cost to inflict these sanctions on the violator. Then imposition of the sanctions becomes a collective action problem, which must be solved by declaring participation in the sanction itself a norm, and its violation subject to similar punishment, and so on.
As should be obvious from this, two key requirements must be met if relational governance is to work: [1] the norms of good behavior, including the secondary norm of participating in sanctions against violators of the primary norms of honesty in transactions, must be clearly understood, and [2] information about each individual's adherence to, or violation of, these norms must be accurately and quickly disseminated to all members of the community.
These requirements imply a major limitation of relation-based governance systems, namely the difficulty of scaling them up. As the number and heterogeneity of transactors and the size and complexity of transactions increase, it becomes harder to sustain the accuracy of communication and adherence to the norms and collective sanctions necessary for success of these institutions.
One might think that modern computerized communication would allow relational governance to extend to a global scale. However, ensuring accurate, truthful communication is more than a matter of the mere technological cost of posting or searching for this information. For example, most sites such as e-Bay and Amazon have much-vaunted systems for rating sellers. But these systems can be manipulated; they merely transfer the issue of trustworthiness or reputation of the primary seller into one of the trustworthiness or reputation, or even the identity or independence, of the evaluator. The owners and managers of these sites recognize the problem; see the discussion in McMillan (2002, pp. 78-9) . The operators of the sites can engage in supervision and enforcement, thereby imposing a top-down or rule-based system of governance (which, however, must rely on the trustworthiness or reputation of the site operator). But more often than not, internet transactions are subject to the caution of caveat emptor; enforcement using formal law is problematic and costly, so the activity is governed only by relational arrangements including reputations based on personal communication in smaller networks.
The limit on the scale of relational governance in turn leads to two further limits: on the efficiency and the degree of competition in economic transactions. Outcomes may fail to be as efficient as the underlying resource endowments, technology, and preferences would permit -that is, the economist's hypothetical first-best may not be attained -because the first-best transactions may not satisfy the constraints that are required for feasibility of relational governance. For example, the most productive use of person A's savings may be too invest them in person B's enterprise, but if A and B do not belong to a common community governed by a system of norms and sanctions, then A, fearing that B would cheat him, may be forced to deal with a person C in his own community and accept a lower return. Of course whether one calls this outcome suboptimal depends on one's view of the constraint.
If one accords the same status to governance technology as to production technology, then the infeasibility of formal governance is just a fact of technology, and the outcome may be optimal subject to technological constraints including that on governance. (This is similar to the argument in information economics that information asymmetry is a technological constraint, and equilibria in this situation should not be labeled inefficient by comparing them to a hypothetical first-best that disregards the information constraint.) Moreover, if a formal governance system can be established at a cost, the higher marginal product from A's dealing with B may be more than offset by the cost of formal governance, and relational governance may be better when benefits are calculated net of the cost of governance (Dixit 2004, p. 76) . However, my intuition, based on the observation that formal systems have gradually replaced informal ones in many contexts, says that the constraint on the scale of relational governance does hurt.
The second limit affects the degree of competition. In a community that is sufficiently small to be governed by relation-based institutions, there may be so few sellers that the market falls significantly short of perfect competition. That in turn creates the usual deadweight losses and perhaps also additional costs of rent-seeking or entry deterrence. These issues are my focus in this paper.
There is of course a huge industrial organization literature that examines various causes and consequences of various types of imperfect competition. Almost all of it assumes the existence of a formal legal system that enforces contracts; moreover, this literature usually ignores the costs of using the legal system. However, it does recognize that the contingencies in which the parties to the contract are required to perform specified actions must be verifiable, that is, capable of being proved in the court meeting its standard for evidence. If the contingencies are observable by the parties themselves but not verifiable to outsiders, then the contract is not enforceable at law. The transaction may still be feasible if the contract (explicit or implicit) is self-enforcing. This is typically the result of an ongoing relationship between the parties, or in game-theoretic terms, a subgame perfect equilibrium of their indefinitely repeated game. Therefore the industrial organization literature connects with that on relation-based governance. However, the latter broadens and reinterprets the former. If the state's legal system is absent altogether, or is too erratic, biased, slow, or corrupt to be usable, then a formal contract is unenforceable even when its contingencies are verifiable in principle.
I explore two well-known models from the industrial organization literature from this perspective. I examine whether and how relational limitations on the size of the market entail imperfects of competition. Then I offer some suggestions for extending the analysis beyond this initial exploration to provide a better integration of the governance and industrial organization aspects.
Monopolistic Competition
The spatial model of monopolistic competition has two aspects of market size: the "geographic" dimension of the space in which the consumers are located, and the density of consumers at any one point in the space. These can have different effects on the communication that is needed for successful relation-based contract enforcement. The news of good or bad behavior may be localized in space as in Dixit (2004, ch. Here is a quick derivation of the model to serve as a reminder and statement of notation; see Salop (1978) for details. Suppose consumers are located uniformly with density D per unit length along a circle of circumference L. Each consumer consumes one unit of the good so long as the price inclusive of "transport" cost is less than v, the willingness to pay.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium with free entry. Each firm has a fixed cost F and marginal cost c; the generalized "transport cost" (the reduction in consumer surplus from consuming a non-ideal variety) is t per unit distance. Let n denote the (endogenous) number of firms in equilibrium, so A = L/n is the distance between any two neighboring firms. Case where several firms sell close but not perfect substitutes Free entry / exit yields (approximately) zero profit for each firm Examples -many consumer products, supermarkets in large town, global auto industry? Multi-firm model of location differentiation. Consider n firms along a circle of circumference L Each firm has fixed cost F and constant marginal cost c If firm charges P, effective price at distance x is P + k x Consider symmetric equilibrium where each firm charges price P* (more complex cases exist) Left figure shows circle with 8 firms; right, just 3 neighbors, with prices and effective prices If one firm deviates to charge P, it sells to distance x either side, defined by P + k x = P* + k ( L/n -x ) , or x = L/(2n) + (P*-P) / (2k) So total quantity it sells is Q = 2 x = L/n + (P*-P)/k x away on either side, defined by
Its profit is
The first-order condition for p to maximize profit is:
and the second-order condition is satisfied:
In the symmetric equilibrium we want (1) to be satisfied when p = p e . Therefore
Free entry leads to Π = 0 (ignoring integer problems); therefore the equilibrium number n e of firms is
Then the solution for p e in terms of the exogenous parameters is given by
The quantity sold by each firm is
The distance between any pair of adjacent firms is
This equilibrium requires that the consumer at the extreme point of any firm's market is willing to pay the disutility-inclusive cost, that is
The optimum would have fewer, larger firms. Suppose there are n firms spaced A = L/n apart. Production costs are
In addition, consumers pay the disutility cost of consuming non-ideal products. Considering
A] on either side of each of the n firms, this cost is
Therefore the total cost is
To minimize this, n should satisfy
Therefore the optimum number of firms is
Now suppose this model pertains to the provision of high-quality experience goods. Interpret v as the premium each consumer is willing to pay for a good that he confidently expects to be high-quality, and c as the extra cost of producing each unit of such a good. (Thus the homogeneous "outside good" behind the scenes of the model includes the low-quality good.) Each firm has the temptation to cheat and produce lower quality. The equilibrium established above would require external enforcement. Consider what happens in the absence of a formal legal system, when consumers buy only from a firm that has a reputation for maintaining high quality. Assume this reputation is local, and the concept of distance in reputation spread is the same as that of distance in the product space. For example, cars may be distinguished by type, and there may be user groups of family sedan owners or sports car owners, so reputation is better maintained within such groups than across them.
Suppose reputation spreads only up to distance K from a firm's location. Various cases arise.
If K is greater than the distance between any pair of adjacent firms in the equilibrium with external enforcement, namely
then a firm that raises is price will lose customers to adjacent firms as before, and the reputation-based equilibrium will be the same as that with external enforcement.
If K is less than half of this distance,
then the equilibrium with external enforcement cannot prevail under relational governance, because a firm will not be able to sell to consumers located between distance K and 1 2 A e away. However, it can raise its price to those who buy from it (i.e. those within distance K on either side), without fear of losing them to its two neighboring firms. It might try to raise the price all the way to v − t K, so the consumers at the two end-points of the interval over which its reputation extends are only just willing to buy. This will be profitable if
This does not hold for K close to 0; it holds for K close to
, which is just the existence condition (7). Therefore it holds for an interval (K min ,
where K min is the smaller root of the quadratic
therefore
To recapitulate, K min is the smallest distance each side of the firm such that, with captive customers in this interval, the firm can make positive profit.
But when K > K min , the firm cannot raise the price too high. The resulting profits will bring new entry. Label the resulting equilibrium s (for the small-K case). The price can only rise to the level defined by
It is easy to verify that (10) implies p s > p e . Ignoring integer problems again, there will be
Since the equilibrium with external enforcement already had more firms than the optimum (n e = 2 n o ), and the small-K case equilibrium has even more (n s > n e ), the relational limit on the size of each firm's market leads to another departure away from the optimum.
As K increases from K min to 
is trickier. Suppose the initial configuration is the same as that of the symmetric zero-profit equilibrium with external enforcement, labeled e. In the present case, even with relational governance, the marginal consumers at the midpoint between two adjacent firms can buy from either. Therefore the first-order condition (1) continues to characterize the local solution to each firm's profit-maximizing price. But it need not yield a global optimum. Facing the initial configuration e, any one firm can focus on a smaller group of consumers, located within distance (A e − K) on either side of it, who are captive because they are farther than K away from the respective neighboring firms. It can raise prices to these captive customers high enough to make a positive profit. This requires
By reasoning similar to that for the small-K case, this is satisfied for K in an interval 
Here the customers at the edge of each firm's market are distant A e − K < 1 2 A e from the neighboring firm. That is within the neighbor's range of reputation, who will then stand to benefit by lowering the price slightly below p m to attract them. So the m configuration cannot be an equilibrium either. It appears that a symmetric zero-profit Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of price and location cannot exist in this case. A Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, or a more forward-looking equilibrium such as that developed by Wilson (1977) to resolve the non-existence problem in the Rothschild-Stiglitz insurance model, may work;
I have not examined these possibilities.
If K is the interval (0, K min ), the size of the market in which reputation for high quality can spread is too small, and high quality cannot be sustained using relational governance.
Only the outside good is consumed, which in the interpretation of this model includes the low-quality good.
If K is in the interval (A e − K min , A e ), starting with a configuration corresponding to the equilibrium e, no firm can deviate to make a profit by focusing on the small group of customers within distance (A e − K). The local maximum found from the first-and secondorder conditions (1) and (2), which led to the e configuration, is also a global maximum.
Therefore that configuration, which was an equilibrium under external enforcement, remains an equilibrium even under relation-based governance.
To sum up, the outcomes corresponding to intervals of increasing K are as follows:
Only low quality (outside good) produced.
A e : High quality supplied to captive consumers.
Departure from optimum gets smaller as K increases.
A e : Standard monopolistic competition equilibrium.
1 2 A e < K < A e − K min : No pure strategy Nash equilibrium
The non-monotonicity is surprising, and has implications for a process or policy that raises K gradually. For a while as K rises, the outcome will improve: each firm will spread its reputation over a larger interval and will supply the high-quality product to more consumers, and prices will drop closer to the level that would prevail with external enforcement.
But as K crosses the 1 2 A e threshold, firms will try to raise prices to a smaller group of captive consumers, but that strategy can in turn be defeated by the price responses of neighboring firms, with the result that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Either the improvement in K should stop at (just short of?) 
Effect of changes in density
Reputation may also be harder to maintain in markets with a high density of consumers, because good communication is harder to achieve with larger numbers regardless of their spread over a large geographic or social space. In our model, such an upper limit on the maintenance of reputation implies that high quality can be provided in a self-enforcing manner only when the parameter D is below an upper bound D. This constraint in turn interacts with the spatial dimension. From (6) and (12) 
Next, K min satisfies the quadratic equation (11); differentiation gives
These show that ∂A e − K min ∂D < 0 if and only if A e decreases by more than K min decreases as D increases, that is,
This is only slightly stronger than the existence condition (7); this has √ 3 ≈ 1.73 on the right hand side versus the 3/2 = 1.5 in the latter. Therefore an increase in D generally makes it uniformly easier to achieve the outcome of standard monopolistic competition using only relational governance. However, in the narrow range between the two conditions, an increase in D will enlarge the non-existence range ( 
Price Premiums and Entry Deterrence
Probably the best-known story in industrial organization for relational self-enforcing contracts is the provision of high-quality experience goods. Klein and Leffler (1981) argued that in order to provide a self-sustaining incentive to continue producing high quality, such a contract must involve price sufficiently in excess of avoidable cost: the short run profit increase (cost saving) from supplying quality lower than that promised should be less than the long run loss of the stream of profit that will result after the consumers realize the deception and stop buying.
Consider the simplest example where there are just two qualities, H = high and L = low, with constant average costs of production c H > c L . Each consumer buys at most one unit, and has willingness to pay v H > v L for the two qualities. Suppose
so it is first-best to produce high quality.
To find the conditions for a self-enforcing steady state in which the firm produces high quality, denote the price of the high-quality product by p H . Define one period as the time it takes consumers to find out the quality of the product, and let r denote the firm's discount rate over this period. If the firm cheats and sells a low-quality good pretending it to have high quality, it will make a extra profit of c H − c L for one period. But thereafter it will lose p H − c H per period, which has capitalized value (p H − c H )/r. Therefore sustained honesty
So long as p H < v H , the consumer will buy and this can be an equilibrium; other considera- Continuing with the simple model, even the redistribution from the consumers to the owners of firms can be offset by ex ante competition. Shapiro (1983, p. 667) shows how introductory offers can do this. Suppose a firm offers a high-quality product at a price p I for one period, followed by p H in all subsequent periods. The present value of its profits is
Free entry will ensure that this is non-positive, so
If p I > c L , then a fly-by-night entrant can make a profit by selling a low-quality product at price p I for one period and then dropping out. Therefore p I ≤ c L , and
Comparing this with (17), we have
and then
The firm making the introductory offer is in effect saying: "I am offering this high-quality product at the same price as a low-quality product. So you have nothing to lose by trying it out. When you find out that it is high-quality, you can continue to buy at the premium price, knowing that the premium gives me enough incentive to maintain the quality."
However, the introductory offer should not be interpreted as a credible signal of the intention to produce high quality in subsequent period. This is a pure moral hazard problem;
there are no distinct types of honest or dishonest firm, so no reason to signal an honest type.
Moreover, a firm's temptation to cheat in the introductory period is (c H − c L ), which is the same regardless of the introductory price, so such a price does not meet Spence's differential cost condition for credible signaling. The credibility of quality comes purely from the price premium, and the introductory price merely serves to meet the zero excess profit condition of ex ante competition among firms. If relevant type distinctions among firms are introduced, there can be a role for signals, whether introductory offers or other dissipative signals such as advertising or construction of expensive headquarters or stores. These then become costs of overcoming the information asymmetry, and are departures from a hypothetical first best.
In the simple model above, each consumer buys just one unit so long as the price is below his maximum willingness to pay. Therefore the mark-up of price over marginal cost does not create any dead-weight losses; it is merely a transfer from consumers to the firm's owners.
But this is a special feature. If quality is continuously variable, consumers shift at the margin from higher to lower qualities; if consumers are heterogeneous, some of them may not be served in equilibrium (Shapiro 1983, Section VI) . Within the limits of the simple model, however, the introductory price gives the consumers a higher surplus in the initial period.
If the consumers have the same discount rate r as do the firms, then the present value of consumer surplus is the same as in the hypothetical first-best where the high quality product is sold at price c H in all periods. If consumers have a higher discount rate than do firms (because of some unmodeled imperfection in capital markets or behavioral departures from conventional rationality), then consumers are even better off with the cheap introductory offer followed by the subsequent price premium that sustains honesty.
In the context of the simple model, then, the self-enforcing or relational solution to the moral hazard problem of providing high-quality products need not create any significant trade-off with competition. Farrell (1986) considers some modifications where barriers to entry can arise, at least in one sense of this much-debated concept (Demsetz 1982, McAfree, Mialon and Williams 2004 ). Farrell's definition is "an obstacle to efficient contracting between buyers and a potential entrant."
Farrell does not construct one completely tied-down model; rather, he develops a framework or a scheme into which many different complete models of equilibrium can be fitted. In his set-up, there are two qualities, high H and low L. To keep the exposition simple, Farrell assumes that the quality L is so bad that no one would buy it at even the cheapest feasible price; in the notation above this means v L < c L . The market has an incumbent firm, and a potential entrant. There are two periods, which need not be of equal length, and period 2 may extend to infinity. At the start of period 1, the entrant makes his decision whether to enter, and if so, with what quality (H or L) and quantity flow (a continuous variable, denoted by x). At the end of this period, consumers find out the entrant's product quality.
If the entrant has chosen L, he can (and will) exit and make zero profits in period 2. If he has chosen H, he cannot switch to L in period 2, but can change the quantity. However, the second-period quantity choice is mostly left behind the scenes, and the relevant magnitudes are expressed in reduced form as functions of the first-period quantity choice x.
The discounted present values of a dollar's flow over the two periods, discounted back to the start of the game, are denoted by W 1 and W 2 respectively, and φ = W 2 /W 1 . For example, if time is actually continuous, period 1 extends from 0 to T 1 , and period 2 extends from T 1 to T 1 + T 2 , then
and
Therefore, if period 1 gets longer, φ decreases, and if period 2 gets longer, φ increases.
Let p(x) denote the first-period price at which the entrant will be able to sell quantity x, if he can persuade buyers that he has chosen H. As the buyers cannot directly observe or experience quality at this point of the game, this has to be the usual inference or rational expectation, formed by observing x (or equivalently p), and knowing the model. The function p(x) is a reduced form, taking into account the incumbent's immediate (period-1) response and the resulting duopoly equilibrium.
Let Π 2 (x) denote the period-2 profit flow of an entrant who has chosen quality H and quantity x in period 1. This is also a reduced form, subsuming the incumbent's period-2 response and the resulting equilibrium. Farrell considers various plausible cases for Π 2 (x), however without setting up the full structure and equilibrium.
The discounted present value of profits of an entrant who chooses H are
whereas those of an entrant who chooses L, planning to make a quick profit in period 1 and exiting, are
Therefore the condition for H to be the better choice is
Observe that p(x) cancels when subtracting the two profit expressions to get (22). Therefore the incentive to sustain high quality is independent of any features of first-period pricing as such, for example introductory offers. This point was made earlier in connection with the simple model.
The second condition for successful entry is positive profit in the chosen mode, that is
The lack of external enforcement of promises makes it necessary for the entrant to credibly convey choice of high quality. This introduces the additional condition (22), and can affect the possibility of entry and the extent of competition in the market.
Scale of Entry
The key point that emerges from Farrell's discussion is that (22) and (23) may be satisfied for different and perhaps mutually incompatible ranges of x. In other words, the scale of entry may matter, and it may not be possible to find a scale that convinces the consumers that the entrant is choosing high quality and also gives positive profit to the entrant.
First consider a case where scale does not matter. If the cost difference ∆C(x) and second-period profits Π 2 (x) are proportional to x, then a common factor x cancels out of (22), so it holds either for all x or for no positive x.
Suppose an entrant supplying high quality at scale x in period 1 will sell s(x) in period 2.
For example s(x) = x if the entrant's reputation is confined to his initial customers, and s(x) = 1, the mass of the whole market, if the reputation spreads to all buyers.
The entrant's second-period profits Π 2 (x) may not increase much with x, for example if his reputation spreads quickly to the whole market so that s(x) = 1, the total mass of consumers in the market, even for small x. If this is the case, while ∆C(x) increases with x, then (22) may hold for small x but not for large x. Then the entrant will be able to establish credibility for high quality by entering at a small scale, and expand in period 2.
Conversely, if information diffuses very slowly through the market, so s(x) = x, while the cost difference between the two qualities is mainly in the fixed cost component, so ∆C(x) does not increase much with x. Then (22) holds, if at all, for large x; entry must be on a large scale to establish credibility. Farrell thinks this case is less likely, but casual observation suggests that it occurs in small communities like Princeton. A few established service providers -contractors for construction, heating and air conditioning, plumbing etc.
-face little competition from entrants because they cannot break into the market at a scale sufficient to establish and spread a comparable reputation for quality.
Entry Deterrence
Suppose the incumbent's response in period 2 is summarized in the level of surplus u he provides to the consumer of each unit of the good. The entrant must match this if he is to make any sales, so he cannot charge a price higher than v H − u. Then the entrant's second-period profits will be
Substituting this in (22),
The incumbent firm may be able to choose u high enough to prevent this. Consider the constant-returns case
Then the entry-deterring level of surplus the incumbent must provide, u, is given by
This is less than the total social surplus per unit of the high-quality good, namely (v H − c H ).
Thus the incumbent is able to extract some surplus while deterring entry. The price it charges, p H = v H − u, is then given by
The similarity of this to the price premium in the simple model is worthy of note. In fact, if the two periods are discrete, period 1 is just one time unit long, and period 2 is the whole future after that, then φ = 1/r and the premium price of the simple model also serves the purpose of entry-deterrence.
However, the threat of entry does have some pro-competitive effect. Without it, the incumbent would have been able to charge an even higher price, almost equal to v H .
Concluding Comments
The main shortcoming of my analysis is its reduced-form nature. In the monopolistically competitive model I took the limits on the size of the market as exogenous parameters, and examined their implications for equilibrium outcomes. In the model dealing with rentsharing for credibility of high quality, some important ingredients of the problem, such as the incumbent's response to entry, and the spread of the entrant's reputation in the population, were specified as exogenous functional forms. Future work should endogenize these entities and provide richer and fuller models that better integrate the governance issues and the industrial organization.
